1 Introduction

The emergence of social media platforms has enabled citizen participation in public affairs (Chadwick & Howard, 2008) and can strengthen local public spheres by offering accessible infrastructure for coordination and information sharing (Thorson et al., 2020). The creation of local groups and pages allows both professional and non-professional news producers to publish information and share their thoughts with other residents (Shehata & Strömbäck, 2021), which can reinvigorate the continuously declining personal connections between locals (Putnam, 2000). This is especially important for communities that struggle to obtain current information from reliable sources due to the lack of local media products. In these “news deserts” (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2019), the formation of an online communication “arena” (Neidhardt, 1994) available to most citizens and the local political elites could boost news dissemination among locals and provide a platform for discussing local issues.

However, national-level studies have identified several barriers to the emergence of rational, informative discourse on social media. Excessive emotional communication, negativity, and the use of deceptive techniques such as bots, fake profiles, and misinformation can disrupt productive discussions (Heiss, 2021; Papacharissi, 2014; Tandoc et al., 2020). These trends have been documented extensively in national and global contexts (e.g., Bruns et al., 2022; Novotná et al., 2023; Vosoughi et al., 2018), but the extent to which they affect the local public sphere remains unclear. Given that these phenomena are inherent to social media communication in general, they likely shape local political discourse in similarly disruptive ways.

At the same time, there are strong arguments that local-level public discourse may be more resistant to disruptive tendencies. First, local public spheres are inherently personal because participants often know one another, have common acquaintances, or are connected through employment and social ties (Burai et al., 2024). This raises questions about whether trends seen nationally, such as emotional manipulation and negativity, also hinder fact-based and problem-solving discussions locally or whether closer personal connections instead foster a higher-quality, more resilient public sphere. Social media provide a visible and accessible arena for information sharing and public discussion, allowing residents to follow local affairs, interact with public officials, and engage with a broader segment of the community than would be possible through offline interactions alone. Although local public spheres are rooted in geographically bounded communities and offline social relationships, they increasingly operate within digital infrastructures designed for communication on much larger scales. Platforms such as Facebook provide standardized features (including groups, pages, public commenting, content sharing, and algorithmically curated content) that local actors appropriate for information sharing, civic discussion, and community coordination. Consequently, local publics do not exist independently of platform architecture: they rely on communication infrastructure developed for global audiences, which they adapt to local information needs and community practices. These platform affordances shape the conditions in which local publics operate without determining how residents use them. Second, local politics is generally less ideologically polarized and conflict-driven than national politics (Navarro et al., 2018), which may support more constructive and less manipulative digital discourse. Third, resource-intensive manipulative techniques like disinformation or astroturfing are less feasible for local actors.

Beyond identifying the presence and characteristics of these dynamics, it is also crucial to explore how local users perceive negativity and disruption and how these perceptions influence their engagement with the digital public sphere. Previous research suggests that individuals (Ekström, 2015) and organizations (Thorson et al., 2020) may actively avoid political discussions to avoid backlash or reputational harm, thus potentially engaging in self-censorship and disengaging. However, little is known about how these tendencies manifest in local political discussions, where the issues often affect citizens more directly and online platforms offer closer and more immediate access to politicians. The perception of being able to influence local political issues could cultivate openness to participation; however, the vulnerability entailed by personal connections and work dependencies may also deter individuals from participating.

In parallel, national and global efforts to counter online disruption focus on misinformation correction, fact-checking, and automated moderation, but their effectiveness and relevance at the local level are unclear. Local communities may develop their own protective mechanisms, such as collective awareness-raising, informal moderation, or community-driven discussions, to navigate the challenges posed by the potential use of bots, fake profiles, and manipulative tactics. Understanding these localized strategies is crucial for assessing whether and how local digital public spheres can resist broader disruptive trends.

By addressing these gaps, the present research aims to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the tensions between disruption and resilience in local digital public spheres. Through an ethnographic exploration, it seeks to uncover not only manifestations of negativity and manipulation but also how users perceive and potentially counteract these influences in their everyday online interactions.

Hungary provides a particularly relevant context for examining affective and disruptive dynamics in local digital public spheres. Over the last decade, the country’s political communication environment has become increasingly centralized and polarized, while social media platforms have gained importance as spaces for information exchange and political discussion (Bene & Farkas, 2022). The Hungarian media system has undergone substantial transformation since 2010. Scholars have documented increasing political parallelism, growing governmental influence over large segments of the media landscape, and declining media pluralism (Bajomi-Lázár, 2020; Bátorfy & Urbán, 2020). The concentration of media ownership culminated in the establishment of the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA), which brought hundreds of pro-government media outlets under a single organizational umbrella. Nonetheless, several opposition-oriented and independent media organizations continue to operate, creating a highly fragmented and politically segmented information environment (Bátorfy & Urbán, 2020). This polarized media landscape has important consequences for political communication, where emotional and conflict-oriented communication plays a prominent role in both political campaigns and everyday political debate. Consequently, Hungary is a useful case for studying how broader patterns of affective political communication may extend into local public spheres.

The importance of social media has also increased considerably in the Hungarian information environment. Facebook is now one of the most influential channels for political communication, particularly because of its broad societal reach and its role in news distribution (Newman et al., 2024). Previous studies have shown that local politicians, municipalities, local media organizations, and citizens rely heavily on Facebook to share information and discuss local issues (Bene & Dobos, 2025). This reliance is especially important in communities where local journalism is weak or absent because it makes social media a central infrastructure for local information flows and public debate.

The present study focuses on the social media–based local public spheres of four Hungarian municipalities with different population sizes and political contexts: Municipality 3 (town; approximately 5,500 inhabitants), Jászberény (city; 25,844), Municipality 4 (village; approximately 2,100), and Szigetszentmiklós (city; 40,069). Digital ethnography is particularly suited to this research because it adapts to the evolving digital environment and enables engagement with citizens in their routine online practices. As Pink and colleagues (2015) suggest, ethnography helps capture the interactions between people and technology, offering a flexible approach that evolves with digital communication. This makes it a useful approach for understanding how social media shapes public discourse. Specifically, it allows the ethnographic approach allows an in-depth exploration of the disruptive and affective dimensions of local public spheres, examining how negativity and deception emerge, what forms they take, and how communities respond. Our exploratory research primarily focuses on Facebook, the most widely used platform in Hungary, with 70% of the population using it and 47% relying on it for news (Newman et al., 2024). Facebook plays an even greater role locally as it serves as the main source of information on municipal affairs (Bene & Dobos, 2025; Thorson et al., 2020

2 Affective and Disruptive Phenomena in the Public Sphere

Social networking sites foster vibrant and productive local public spheres through their affordances. In locally oriented groups and pages, interactions and the flow of locally relevant information can enhance community cohesion. Research suggests that social media platforms can play an important role in local communities, acting as neighborhood hotspots that increase local awareness (De Meulenaere et al., 2020) and reinforce the persistence and pervasiveness of community bonds (Hampton, 2016). These platforms also support online neighborhood networks, which strengthen the relationship between digital communication practices and local community dynamics (Robaeyst et al., 2022).

According to the normative approach, rational and open deliberation can serve as the basis for democratic political action (Dewey, 2016; Habermas, 1984). In theory, the social media-based local public sphere facilitates deliberation on local issues and news while giving citizens a platform to express their political stances (Heiss, 2021). However, in practice, real dynamics in the online public sphere may diverge from this ideal.

2.1 Affect

As Zizi Papacharissi (2014) suggests, networked publics enable the emergence of affective publics. In these publics, communicative performances are often shaped by emotions, which play a key role in mobilization and public expression. Importantly, research shows that participation in political discourses is often motivated by negative feelings such as anger or anxiety (Heiss, 2021), which can lead to incivility (Szabó et al., 2021), mockery, or personal attacks (Rösner et al., 2016; Rowe, 2015).

Because people might feel that there are limited or no repercussions for their online activity, they are more likely to communicate in an uncivil manner on social media platforms (Gervais, 2025). In this context, the body of literature on negativity and incivility in online public discourse has been growing, but the topic has mostly been studied on the national or even global level, with a focus on their causes and effects on individuals (e.g., Chen & Lu, 2017; Hmielowski et al., 2014; Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). Notably, Novotná et al. (2023) found that participation in online discussions about crisis situations, such as the COVID-19 pandemic or the Russo-Ukrainian War, declines over time as discussions become more polarized and uncivil and disinformation spreads. This means that the uncivil, divisive nature of such discourse may deepen the gap between opposing sides and eventually lead individuals to avoid participating in political discussion on social media (Marchal, 2022).

Although research on the local public sphere is limited, existing studies indicate that incivility is also present at the local level. For instance, Coe and colleagues (2014) examined comments to a local newspaper and found that incivility is a common feature of online discussions. This is especially the case regarding serious or divisive topics and issues, where opposing sides clearly exist and name-calling is the most common form of uncivil messages. Studies also report that social media provide an environment for online abuse and trolling against local politicians (Carson et al., 2024; Southern & Harmer, 2021). As concerns platforms, Rowe (2015) observed that users are more likely to leave harsh, uncivil comments and target other discussion participants on websites where they are not identifiable than on Facebook. Negative connotations associated with political discussions on Facebook, such as rants and intense disagreements (Vraga et al., 2015), along with social pressure for politeness and harmony, could lead individuals to refrain from discussing divisive political topics online (Eveland Jr. & Hively, 2009). This tendency may be particularly pronounced in local contexts, where participants in the local public sphere are more likely to know each other personally or have common acquaintances.

The local public sphere may function differently not only due to its more personal nature, but also because of the specificity of localism (Otjes, 2024), where national parties’ candidates often have to compete with local politicians. This dynamic leads to a more issue-based political scene. The focus on local concerns fosters a more depoliticized environment, in which national party lines and political identities play a less prominent role (Navarro et al., 2018). As a result, local politics tends to be less conflictual, with fewer intense disputes and less incivility than in national politics. However, it remains unclear whether the more personal nature of relationships and the potential social consequences of incivility, such as reputational damage or strained community ties, can restrain negativity and uncivil discourse in local settings.

Meanwhile, recent scholarship suggests that emotions are not necessarily opposed to deliberation. Emotions can contribute to public reasoning and political engagement while also enabling the articulation of experiences and concerns that might otherwise remain marginalized (Wessler, 2018; Young, 1997). In this context, affective publics are understood as communicative formations in which emotions play a constitutive role in public communication and collective meaning-making (Lünenborg, 2019). Accordingly, although this study examines negativity and incivility as important features of local public discourse, it does not treat affect as inherently detrimental to the functioning of local public spheres.

2.2 Disruption

The notion of disruption is increasingly used in research on digital political communication; however, it is not yet a clearly defined and unified theoretical concept. Instead of referring to a single phenomenon, previous studies have highlighted various processes that can undermine the functioning of the public sphere. Habermas (1984) conceptualizes the public sphere as a space for information exchange, opinion formation, and deliberation, and more recent scholarship has pointed to the ways digital communication environments can challenge these functions. Bennett and Pfetsch (2018), for example, argue that contemporary digital media contribute to the emergence of a “disrupted public sphere,” characterized by fragmented audiences and weakened common informational foundations, as well as the proliferation of parallel narratives. Similarly, Bimber and de Zúñiga (2020) describe the epistemic vulnerabilities of the “unedited” public sphere, where limited gatekeeping and platform affordances facilitate manipulation and complicate the assessment of information credibility.

Building on these perspectives, we use disruption as an analytical category rather than a distinct theoretical concept. In this study, the term refers to communicative practices that undermine the informational, deliberative, or participatory functions of the local public sphere. Therefore, what is disrupted is not the technological infrastructure of social media but the capacity of local publics to facilitate trust-based information exchange and meaningful civic participation. From this perspective, practices such as the use of fake profiles, the spread of rumors, trolling, and other manipulative behaviors can be understood as disruptive because they distort information flows and reduce trust or even discourage participation. We distinguish these phenomena from affective dynamics such as negativity and incivility, which primarily shape the tone and emotional character of public discourse, although the two dimensions often overlap in practice.

The category of “fake profiles” encompasses practices with substantially different intents and perceived legitimacy. Our findings suggest that local actors do not view all forms of profile inauthenticity similarly. At one end of the spectrum are profiles created for manipulative purposes, such as trolling, coordinated influence attempts, or creating the appearance of public support. At the other end are profiles used by real local residents who conceal their identities to avoid social, political, or professional repercussions while still participating in local discussions. Between these two extremes are various forms of pseudonymous participation whose authenticity and legitimacy may be contested. We therefore use the term “fake profile” as an umbrella category employed by the participants themselves, while recognizing that different forms of profile inauthenticity may have distinct motivations, consequences, and normative implications.

Social media platforms are often considered facilitators of deception and manipulation in the public sphere, not only because they enable the rapid spread of false information (Vosoughi et al., 2018) but also because they allow the use of fake profiles, bots, and other covert tactics to distort public discourse. A growing body of literature on disinformation has developed, but these efforts mainly concentrate on conceptual aspects (Chadwick & Stanyer, 2022; Freelon & Wells, 2020; Hameleers, 2023) or how deception works on the national or global scale (e.g., Squicciarini & Griffin, 2014).

Although theories on disinformation vary, they include common definitional elements, such as the intentional dissemination of false information or messages. Disinformation is considered deceptive because it is deliberately designed to lead to the adoption of false beliefs (Chadwick & Stanyer, 2022). Misinformation differs from disinformation in that it consists in spreading false information unintentionally (Chadwick et al., 2018). Bennett and Pfetsch (2018) suggest that it is not only the spread of falsehoods but the construction of online parallel realities enforced by social media platforms through their algorithms and affordances that challenges the communication environment. Some argue that platform affordances also enable bots and trolls to participate in discussions, creating disrupted public spheres (Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018).

Discussing the role of technology in the epistemic problems of the “unedited” public sphere, Bimber and de Zúñiga (2020) suggest that social media platforms’ affordances facilitate manipulation and deception in a context where citizens have limited abilities to overcome these challenges, therefore increasing users’ vulnerability to false beliefs (Benkler et al., 2018). One of these affordances enables users to easily share and forward content on these platforms, which can obscure not only the source of the information but also the identity of the author (Bimber & de Zúñiga, 2020). Importantly, existing studies primarily explore the disruption of the online public sphere in relation to national or global events and issues, such as elections, the COVID-19 pandemic, and military conflicts (Bruns et al., 2022), while manipulation and falsehoods on the local level have received little attention.

In the local context, where citizens often have closer personal relationships, disinformation may be less pronounced because users can more easily identify the source of content shared within their networks. Personal familiarity among locals may serve as self-protection against fake profiles and falsehoods. However, Friggeri and colleagues (2014) highlight the importance of social ties in rumor propagation: users are more likely to trust content shared by their friends, family, and personal acquaintances. Consequently, social networks anchored in the offline world can amplify the spread of false information and (often fake or exaggerated) rumors online. This suggests that local social media-based public spheres may be more vulnerable to manipulation and deceptive techniques. In sum, although some resource-intensive forms of coordinated manipulation may be less common at the local level, local publics are not immune to external attempts to shape online discussions. Building on these scholarly discussions, we investigate the following research question:

RQ1: How do affective and disruptive phenomena manifest in the local public sphere?

3 Public Perceptions and Participation

Social media provide a platform for local civic discussion and direct communication between elected officials and residents, but little is known about how users perceive negativity and disruption in the local public sphere and how these factors affect their actual participation. Concerns about negative reactions and reputational harm may lead both individuals and organizations to avoid controversial political discussions on Facebook, resulting in self-censorship and disengagement. This fear of controversy and negative reactions can lead users to censor their own content. In this regard, Thorson and colleagues (2020) found that participants often frame their messages carefully or focus on positive topics to prevent backlash. The uncivil nature of online comments has a negative impact on individuals but can also harm the deliberative function of the public sphere (Rösner et al., 2016) by influencing others to communicate in a similar manner (Zimmerman & Ybarra, 2016), eventually causing fear of participation (Burai et al., 2024). These dynamics also shape the experiences of passive followers or “lurkers” (John et al., 2009).

Users’ perceptions of the public sphere significantly influence their willingness to participate in online discussions. Given concerns about negativity, incivility, and manipulation, it is crucial to examine how local community members perceive and interpret these phenomena and how these perceptions shape their participation in social media-based local publics. Accordingly, we propose our second research question:

RQ2: How do members of the local public perceive and interpret affective and disruptive phenomena in social media – based local public spheres? How do these perceptions impact their participation in these spaces?

4 Protective Mechanisms

To address disruptions of the online public sphere, such as misinformation, bots, and fake profiles, protective mechanisms have been implemented at the national and global levels. These efforts largely focus on fact-checking–initiatives aimed at correcting false information – and education (Chou et al., 2021; Sádaba et al., 2023). However, the effectiveness of these interventions and how they impact people’s beliefs remain unclear (Walter et al., 2020). Simultaneously, social media platforms are actively working to identify and remove bots, although more sophisticated ones can often evade detection (Ferrara et al., 2016; Kollanyi, 2016).

While large-scale initiatives focus on broader misinformation issues, local communities often face unique challenges that may not be fully addressed by national frameworks. This gap highlights the importance of localized efforts, where communities find ways to protect themselves through awareness-raising and public discussions that allow them to collectively address and resist disinformation and fake profiles.

In this context, Facebook groups and pages serve as critical sources of information and discussion platforms in local public spheres. Although they can positively influence the local community and politics (Robaeyst et al., 2022), the question remains whether local communities can effectively protect themselves against negativity, incivility, and the spread of falsehoods. If so, what protective mechanisms emerge? One potential tool for this protection is moderation; however, its existence and effectiveness in local settings are still uncertain, along with how much moderation is necessary to prevent personal attacks, misinformation, and other forms of negativity (Gibson, 2019; Pfaffenberger, 1996). Administrators and moderators act as gatekeepers of local digital public spheres by deciding who can join the conversations and what content or comments are published, hidden, or even removed (Gillespie, 2018; Malinen, 2021). As a result, the owners of local pages and groups can play a crucial role in the community’s self-protection against deceptive techniques on social media, as well as against negativity and incivility. Accordingly, their knowledge and experience, the moderation policies they follow, and how clear the latter are to participants in the local public spheres should be studied. Given the importance of localized efforts and the role of moderators in shaping online discourse, it is essential to explore the protective mechanisms that emerge at the local level to address these disruptions. In light of this, this study investigates a third research question:

RQ3: What protective mechanisms, if any, emerge at the local level to counteract affective and disruptive phenomena?

5 Method

We selected four cases to ensure diversity in geographical location and size and represent different political contexts: two municipalities in a relatively calm period, one in the midst of an election campaign, and one shaken by a significant political issueThese studies often focus on single contexts, which limits their generalizability; in contrast, our research takes a broader approach by examining multiple municipalities. This allows for a deeper understanding of the role that negativity and manipulation play in local communities.

We completed approximately two months of digital ethnography (Pink et al., 2015) in each of the four selected Hungarian municipalities. The cases were chosen purposively to maximize variation in municipality size, geographical location, and political context. This comparative design enabled us to examine whether similar patterns emerged in diverse local contexts.

First, we conducted preliminary research on each community, during which we identified current and previous crucial issues, local actors, and all relevant media outlets, social media groups, and pages. Building on previous research showing that Facebook is the dominant platform for local political communication in Hungary (Bene & Dobos, 2025), preliminary observations confirmed Facebook as the only relevant local platform; therefore, our study focused exclusively on it. In each municipality, we conducted open-ended observations of all relevant public Facebook pages and groups that regularly shared information or hosted discussions about local affairs. Only public pages and groups were included due to ethical and privacy considerations. We took field notes (Emerson et al., 2011), which were shared and discussed within the research team. Using focused coding (Esterberg, 2002), we identified emerging patterns and themes in local publics. The first cases revealed that negativity and disruption were central to the local public sphere, prompting us to examine these aspects more closely in the other municipalities.

Based on these findings, we conducted semi-structured interviews with locally important actors (politicians, active social media users, and page administrators) either online or in person. An interview guide was developed iteratively based on the research questions and insights from the ethnographic observations. Interviews focused on participants’ experiences of local Facebook discussions, perceptions of negativity and manipulation, the latter’s effects on participation in local public life, and the strategies used by community members and administrators to respond to disruptive behavior. The questions were adapted to the role and experiences of each interviewee.

Interviewees were selected through purposive sampling based on their visibility and activity in the local public sphere. Accordingly, interviews were conducted with active citizens, politicians, activists, and page or group administrators who played important roles in local online discussions. Although we sought to include a broad range of citizen perspectives and contacted numerous residents during fieldwork, recruitment proved more challenging among less publicly active citizens, particularly in smaller municipalities. Recruitment was most difficult in the two smaller villages, but we included them because they provided valuable insights into social media-based publics in less populous communities. Several interviewees reported that residents might be reluctant to discuss local political issues due to concerns about potential social, professional, or political repercussions. To compensate for this limitation, the ethnographic observations incorporated the contributions of ordinary citizens through their posts, comments, and interactions in local Facebook groups and pages.

The analysis therefore combined ethnographic field notes and interview material. Following an iterative interpretive approach, the research team jointly reviewed field notes and interview transcripts to identify recurring themes, patterns, and phenomena relevant to the research questions. Emerging interpretations were discussed repeatedly within the research team and informed the subsequent stages of data collection and analysis.

To protect participant anonymity, pseudonyms are used for the two smallest municipalities.

Jászberény

Jászberény is a medium-sized city in central Hungary, located approximately 80 km from Budapest. Its population has slightly declined in the last decades, but remains demographically similar to the national average (Census Database – HCSO, n.d.). The main political actors are the Member of Parliament from the governing Fidesz – KDNP alliance and the opposition-aligned mayor. Conflicts between them and within the opposition intensified after the city council split evenly, leading to its dissolution in October 2022. This created an opportunity to study a politically polarized local public sphere during an election period. Fieldwork was conducted between November 26, 2022, and January 15, 2023, and included observations of 41 Facebook pages and six public groups, as well as eight semi-structured interviews with citizens, politicians, and moderators.

Szigetszentmiklós

Located in the Budapest agglomeration, Szigetszentmiklós developed as a suburban town due to migration from the capital. Since 2020, political tensions between the mayor and two opposition parties have drawn national attention. Additional local debates include intra-opposition disputes and opposition to a planned logistics center that has spurred offline activism. Observation ran from January 16 to March 20, 2024, following a two-week preliminary phase. Five groups and 26 pages were monitored, and four interviews were conducted with an active resident, an administrator, a politician, and an activist.

Municipality 3

Municipality 3 is a small Hungarian town of approximately 5,500 residents. During the observation period, the local public debate was strongly shaped by a controversial development project that generated substantial citizen mobilization, including the creation of civic initiatives, public forums, and petitions. This case enabled an analysis of local online discussions during a period of heightened political engagement and collective action. Observation took place from October to mid-December 2023, covering 25 pages and 16 groups, and was supplemented by four interviews with residents and activists.

Municipality 4

Municipality 4 is a Hungarian village of approximately 2,100 residents. During fieldwork (October – December 2023), no major political controversies emerged, but social media served as an important source of local information. The largest local Facebook group had more members than the village population. One interview was conducted with an active user who suggested that some residents were reluctant to discuss local political issues due to concerns about potential repercussions within the small community.

As in all ethnographic research, the researchers’ backgrounds and interpretations inevitably shaped both data collection and analysis (Pink et al., 2015). The research team consisted of scholars with prior experience studying local political communication and social media use in Hungary. Although none of the researchers were residents of the municipalities examined, all were familiar with the broader Hungarian political and media environment. This familiarity facilitated the interpretation of local political conflicts and communication practices but also required continuous reflexivity regarding potential preconceptions about polarization, negativity, and political actors.

To mitigate these risks of subjectivity, field notes were regularly shared and discussed among members of the research team throughout the ethnographic process. Emerging interpretations were compared across cases, and researchers continuously explored alternative explanations for observed behaviors and interactions. The multi-site design also helped reduce the influence of context-specific assumptions by enabling comparisons between municipalities with different political and social characteristics.

6 Results

6.1 Negativity and Manipulation

In response to RQ1, we find that emotions were a common feature of local discussions and often accompanied engagement with local issues. In line with research emphasizing the constitutive role of affect in public communication (Lünenborg, 2019), affective expressions were not necessarily detrimental to the local public sphere. However, interviewees most frequently identified hostility, personal attacks, and intimidation as problematic forms of communication. Accordingly, both negativity and manipulation emerged as significant characteristics of the social media-based local public sphere, although their manifestations varied in intensity depending on the size of the municipality.

Both affection and disruption were observed primarily in the larger municipalities. In contrast, the public spheres of the two smaller towns in our study, Municipality 3 and Municipality 4, featured comments that were less harsh and vulgar. In Municipality 4, the main purpose of the local groups was to share public information. While some posts raised issues and sparked debate, these discussions rarely became hostile, and criticism of the local leadership was also infrequent. In Municipality 3, criticism was mostly directed at the plans to create battery recycling plants, specifically at the governing politicians and the company behind the project. In the other two cases, negative discourse manifested in various forms, but it was predominantly personal in nature. As one of our interviewees highlighted, “in reality, pretty much everyone in town knows who is aligned with whom and what they are doing.” Because users were familiar with each other, negativity often revolved around personal information or rumors. In several instances, politicians were photographed during private activities such as visiting a pub and subsequently labeled as alcoholics. Similarly, local residents were targeted based on personal details, such as past divorces or imprisonment, which were used against them in attacks.

Based on our observations, politicians in office also engaged in uncivil communication mainly in the two larger cities, whereas officials in the other two locations refrained from such behavior. In Jászberény and Szigetszentmiklós, some politicians frequently liked posts containing negative or uncivil content or even made such comments themselves. For instance, when responding to critical remarks about themselves, politicians often used offensive language, such as “Are you completely stupid ... comrade?” or “I understand that you are a member of another party, but a malicious remark cannot be equated with stupidity.” Meanwhile, some politicians used negative tonality to gain visibility. One even replied to a comment as follows: “what you call provocation is not the goal itself, but rather a tool to ensure that people even notice the post on their news feed.” This suggests that politicians may deliberately use negativity to gain engagement, a tactic that locals also identified as problematic during interviews.

Citizens, administrators, political candidates, and activists in all municipalities reported receiving threats related to their online activity, including death threats in one case. However, one of our interviewees pointed out that users who send threats often appeared to be non-local based on their account details or used fake profiles.

In terms of disruption, the interviewees did not consider fake news or bots to be particularly relevant in the local context. Instead, they believed the issue to lie more in parallel narratives and misunderstandings, with occasional national fake news or clickbait content appearing at the local level. While fake news was not prevalent locally, extreme rumors occasionally circulated about politicians or citizens active in the online public sphere. Notably, the use of fake profiles was consistently mentioned and critically addressed in all the towns studied. Administrators in different municipalities spoke about encountering multiple fake profiles attempting to engage in trolling in their groups at the same time, likening them to “paratroopers” and “dive-bombers.” Locals also suspected that fake profiles were used strategically to react to posts in order to manipulate the algorithm and increase their visibility. In Municipality 3, participants believed that fake profiles were employed to create the illusion of local support for the construction of the battery plant.

6.2 Perceptions and Impact

Locals frequently highlighted both in interviews and online comments that they viewed negativity and the widespread use of fake profiles as considerable issues (RQ2). They also find that this could discourage individuals from engaging in online political discourse or lead them to avoid commenting under their real name.

Our interviewees often stated that the negative nature of online discussions acted as a deterrent for participation. For instance, one commented on the negative nature of online discourse and attacks, stating:

but normal people … when they saw something like that again, they thought “Oh my God,” and then just left the page. The people I spoke with, even older generations, said, “How can people stoop so low? Why does it have to be this way? Why is this good?” (Group admin 1, personal communication, 2024)

All interviewees agreed that expressing opinions under one’s real identity carries inherent risks, including exposure to incivility, the online dissemination of personal information, and the spread of rumors. Some also expressed concerns about losing their jobs or these attacks potentially extending into the offline world.

An interviewee also argued that negativity and personal attacks in local Facebook groups undermine trust in information sharing. They noted that

it has become a trend on local Facebook pages and groups to engage in highly aggressive communication, attacking each other rather than debating based on facts, with discussions often turning into personal attacks. As a result, neither side or group can truly be considered a reliable source of information, and people do not see them as such. (Civilian 1, personal communication, 2024)

Even though negativity may deter active online participation and undermine trust in online content, the high number of followers of local mayors’ pages and local media outlets, especially relative to population size, suggests that many locals still keep track of the online local public sphere. A local politician told us, “based on the numbers and analytics on my page, I can see that many people rely on Facebook for information.” Interviews also revealed the presence of “lurkers,” that is, individuals who join groups and follow discussions without commenting or reacting to posts or who stay informed by reading local news without liking pages or joining groups. This pattern of passive engagement highlights a key dynamic in local digital public spheres: while many people remain present and informed, only a select few actively shape the discourse. As a result, these spaces are often dominated by individuals who are either less sensitive to negativity and incivility or more willing to withstand it. A moderator explained that in their group, “there was someone who said they don’t join the group, they observe, but don’t comment or post because they’re not willing to stoop to that level.” Similarly, an interviewee recounted that their wife was approached on a bus and congratulated for a Facebook post he had published. However, the other person admitted that they had not dared to like or share the post.

Following local Facebook pages and groups is often a necessity in smaller municipalities, where local media may be absent and news and relevant information are primarily shared through social media. Some interviewees also expressed a sense of connection to their community, feeling the need to stay informed about local events to engage and communicate with others. During our observation, multiple issues were raised by citizens on Facebook, prompting responses from politicians. Local political actors also confirmed that they made an effort to address the concerns raised by locals online, which may further encourage participation despite the deterrent effects of negativity. A broader pattern of passive engagement persists nonetheless, with many users choosing to stay informed instead of actively contributing. This dynamic allowed a small number of voices – those more resistant to incivility – to dominate the local digital public sphere.

Although locals often criticized fake profile usage online, many were also apologetic towards them, viewing these profiles as a means of commenting without restrictions. One interviewee discussed the personal risks of engaging with political topics on social media, stating that only “those who are not dependent on the local government can like and comment freely.” Acceptance of fake profiles may be higher on the local level than nationally because the personal nature of local public spheres heightens the privacy risks. Still, participation in these forums was viewed by many as an important civic duty or responsibility. Another local reflected on the duality of how fake profiles are perceived, emphasizing the need for some form of filtering. While recognizing that everyone has the right to privacy and protection from harm, they also pointed out that anonymity makes it significantly easier to attack others: “If there’s no face, no picture, no grandchildren on the profile picture or something like that displayed, it’s much easier to hurt someone. Like, ‘Oh, they don’t know who I am anyway, so I can say whatever I want without consequences’.” Locals who actively used social media or served as administrators of local pages or groups often distinguished between different types of users by labeling those with negative intentions (e.g., those engaging in provocation) as “trolls.”

6.3 Protective Mechanisms

Several locals in all municipalities explained that the online public sphere was an essential aspect of their municipality’s life and viewed it as their civic duty to maintain its integrity. This sense of local commitment pushed many participants to actively engage in efforts to raise awareness of and address the perceived issues or shortcomings of the local public sphere. Connecting to RQ3, these protective mechanisms emerged in various forms: locals frequently called out fake profiles or avoided engaging with them, and local pages and users attempted to expose the individuals behind these profiles. Additionally, administrators in all municipalities stated that they tried to counteract the problematic, often negative and disruptive nature of discussions in local groups.

Locals left comments such as “Your fake profile is a distraction!” to call out fake profiles or attempted to prevent others from engaging with trolls by saying, “Let it go, they’re being paid for this!” Other strategies included responding to these profiles while explicitly pointing out that the other participant was using a fake profile: “I don’t like talking to fake profiles, so I’m not responding to you directly, I’m just replying for the sake of the members.”

Although the administrators viewed their own roles differently, they all reported striving to keep the discussions in their groups within acceptable boundaries by moderating excessively offensive, personal, or trolling content.

One interviewee stated:

Racist or homophobic comments are deleted immediately if flagged by the system, as it is inconceivable in today’s world to allow such content. I am a supporter of debate, but let’s keep it within those boundaries and not against private individuals. Because the problem now is that when people insult each other, it becomes very ugly. (Group admin 2, personal communication, 2024)

However, another moderator also highlighted that in some cases, remaining impartial is difficult when it comes to sanctioning group members: “of course, we don’t want to do that, because we agree with them – we share the same ideology, but it’s difficult to coordinate people, especially when I’m in this kind of situation during an election.”

Serving as gatekeepers of their communities made administrators more vulnerable to attacks: an interviewee mentioned that he and another administrator “have been threatened before, I have been threatened, and my family has also been threatened.” Other administrators also reported that their personal information was posted online, they were shouted at on the street, or their family members received negative comments in person regarding their online activity.

Moderators employed different strategies to deal with fake profiles. One interviewee explained that they carefully selected each member of their group, relying on mutual acquaintances and the individual’s online activities to ensure that only legitimate local profiles were allowed to join. Others were more tolerant of fake profiles, viewing them as a form of self-protection in online debates. However, they made efforts to combat trolls by identifying and even trying to expose them: “It’s a small town, and you can’t hide behind fake names for too long here. As we call them, they are trolls. ... For example, we’ve just started listing them as trolls in the group, so we decided to put an end to this harsh public discourse, if possible.”

7 Discussion

Like the national online public sphere, local spheres are marked by negativity and manipulation. However, our findings indicate that their dynamics differ based on the local context. Although negativity and disruption were common in all the local publics in the study, their intensity and expression varied, particularly by municipality size. In smaller municipalities, the more personal nature of social relations appeared to limit such behaviors. This finding is consistent with Rowe’s (2015) argument that identifiability can constrain uncivil communication while also extending previous research on local incivility (Coe et al., 2014) by showing that personal familiarity may simultaneously discourage and personalize attacks.

Our findings also illustrate how locally rooted public communication unfolds within globally standardized platform infrastructures. Although Facebook was designed primarily for large-scale, translocal communication rather than local democratic engagement, residents appropriate its affordances by creating groups and pages for information sharing, community coordination, and political discussion, as well as following, reacting to, and commenting on the posts of local actors. The empirical patterns observed in this study therefore reflect the interaction between locally specific social relationships and the broader socio-technical architecture within which these public interactions take place. The participants themselves also demonstrated an awareness of these platform dynamics, referring to algorithmic visibility and the perceived strategic exploitation of platform features (e.g., fake profiles and coordinated engagement) to increase the visibility of political content. This suggests that local public spheres should be understood in relation to not only community characteristics but also the platform environments in which they operate.

Personal ties can foster community but also introduce challenges. Notably, one prominent form of negativity involves the use of personal information in online debates and attacks. Yet these attacks are less frequent in smaller communities, where greater accountability and social proximity seem to deter extreme behavior.

Unlike studies emphasizing misinformation and large-scale manipulation in national publics (Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018; Bimber & de Zúñiga, 2020), our findings suggest that local actors primarily perceive disruption as occurring through fake profiles and rumors rather than bots or coordinated disinformation campaigns. Fake profiles are widely discussed and divisive: they are viewed both as sources of disruption and as tools for self-protection. Locals often justify their use as a defensive response to privacy risks and potential personal attacks, especially in politically sensitive debates. Moreover, participation in these forums is seen as a civic duty, which reinforces the acceptance of anonymity as a means of safely engaging in public discourse.

The perception of negativity and its impact on participation are significant concerns. Many locals reported that the prevalence of negativity, personal attacks, and fake profiles led them to refrain from commenting or actively engaging in discussions. This mirrors previous findings indicating that concerns about backlash can discourage participation in political discussions on social media (Ekström, 2015; Thorson et al., 2020) and extends these observations to local digital publics. However, they do not necessarily disengage entirely; instead of participating, many continue to follow conversations as silent observers. The prevalence of such passive followers resembles the “lurker” behavior described by John et al. (2009), suggesting that negativity may alter participation patterns without necessarily reducing attention to local affairs. While the fear of personal attacks or exposure discourages direct interaction, the desire to stay informed about local issues often outweighs these concerns. In some cases, the visibility of negativity may even attract attention, given the popularity of negative content on social media (Bene, 2020). Thus, although negativity can suppress active participation, it does not entirely drive users away from local online public spheres. Instead, it alters engagement patterns, reinforcing inequalities in voice and influence, as only certain individuals may feel comfortable contributing to discussions.

In response to these challenges, both locals and administrators have developed protective mechanisms to mitigate negative behaviors within local online spaces. At the community level, members actively seek to identify and expose fake profiles or challenge misleading narratives circulating within the groups. This collective effort aims to preserve the integrity of discussions and ensure that harmful or deceptive content is addressed.

Administrators play a critical role in moderating local Facebook groups by actively identifying and dealing with disruptive behaviors such as trolling and personal attacks. They utilize available tools, including muting and individual bans, to maintain a more civil discourse. The protective strategies employed by both administrators and group members stem from a sense of commitment to their municipalities. However, while moderation serves as a crucial protective mechanism, it also grants significant power to administrators, who shape the primary forums of local public discourse based on their own judgments, often without clear accountability or transparency. Moreover, moderators themselves acknowledge that remaining unbiased in their decisions can be challenging because their personal views and relationships within the community may influence their moderation practices. Future research should further examine the implications of this dynamic, particularly the extent to which moderation practices influence the inclusivity and openness of local digital public spheres.

Beyond differences related to municipality size, the cases studied here also suggest that political context shapes the character of local online discussions. In Jászberény, where fieldwork took place during an election campaign, negativity was frequently linked to political competition between rival actors. In Municipality 3, discussions were less partisan but strongly driven by a contentious local issue – a proposed development project – on which emotions and mobilization centered. By contrast, in Municipality 4, where no major political conflicts occurred during the observation period, local Facebook groups functioned primarily as channels for information sharing rather than political contestation. These differences suggest that the intensity and form of affective and disruptive dynamics are shaped not only by community size but also by the political salience of local issues and the level of conflict in the local political environment.

Taken together, these findings suggest that the key challenge facing local digital public spheres is not the presence of negativity or disruption per se but how communities can adapt to them. Instead of abandoning local online spaces, citizens develop strategies to manage the risks associated with participation, including passive observation, pseudonymous engagement, and collective efforts to identify disruptive actors. This points to a form of resilience rooted in local social ties and a shared commitment to community affairs. At the same time, these adaptations may generate new inequalities, as public discussion is increasingly shaped by those willing to accept the social costs of visibility. Thus, local digital public spheres appear neither fully disrupted nor fully deliberative; they are characterized by an ongoing negotiation between participation, vulnerability, and community self-protection.

While, in theory, the social media-based local public sphere could facilitate deliberation on local issues and allow citizens to express their political views, the literature on the national level shows that this ideal is often disturbed by the affective and disruptive nature of political discourse, which hinders rational deliberation. Our findings indicate that this issue extends to local contexts, though with unique characteristics depending on the size of municipalities. Negativity and incivility are considered major issues by locals, and they are very personal. Disruptive mechanisms are also present, especially fake profiles and trolling; however, bots and fake news are not prevalent at the local level. The smaller scale of the local public sphere presents an opportunity for developing effective protective measures against these challenges. Citizens expressed a need for these, as bottom-up efforts are already underway to expose fake profiles, and moderators also use available tools to keep the discourse civil. This highlights that the presence of moderators and administrators can help shape the local public sphere, but it also places significant power in their hands. Future studies could therefore identify effective strategies that empower local communities to counteract negativity and disruption. In line with results from the national level, we also found that negativity can deter engagement in online political discussions, deepening inequalities in political participation. However, locals still visit these spaces because they feel a sense of commitment to the municipality and social media are some of the most important platforms for local political information sharing.

Our study has several limitations. First, recruiting interviewees proved challenging in the smaller municipalities, possibly because of political dependencies linked to employment or financial assistance, as well as a general distrust of outsiders. Second, our analysis focused exclusively on Facebook as the dominant platform of local political communication in Hungary; therefore, the findings cannot be generalized to other social media platforms. Third, the study examined only publicly accessible pages and groups due to ethical and privacy considerations, meaning that communication occurring in private or in closed online spaces was not captured. Although the observations and interviews provide valuable insights into local social media-based publics, further research is needed to explore these communities in greater depth and in a wider range of local contexts.

Despite these limitations, the study provides new ethnographic insights into the dynamics of social media-based local public spheres and highlights the importance of examining digital political communication beyond the national level.

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Funding

Krisztina Burai’s research was supported by the Momentum program of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA–ELTE TK Lendület “Momentum” PRISMA research project [LP2024‐2/2024]).

Date received: 15 January 2026

Date accepted: 23 July 2026